Navigating Channelisation and Unlicensed Play: What Data Reveals about Europe’s iGaming Landscape

In its autumn 2025 monitoring report, the Ksa estimated licensed online GGR of €600 million and unlicensed GGR of €617 million for January–June 2025. Its estimate at that time put the licensed share of GGR at 49%. These were half-year revenue estimates, not annual stakes.

A separate player measure found that approximately 94% of online players used only licensed operators. The 49% figure did not mean that only 49% of players used licensed sites. The two measures suggested that unlicensed activity was concentrated among a smaller group with relatively high losses.

Later revision: The Ksa subsequently revised the licensed GGR share for the first half of 2025 to 56%. The original estimate should not be presented as the current estimate for that period or as settled proof that unlicensed revenue exceeded licensed revenue.

Understanding player behaviour

Frontier’s British research identified bonuses, anonymity and fewer restrictions among reported attractions of unregulated offers. Those findings describe the study’s respondents and methods; they do not establish that every unlicensed player has the same motivation.

Some consumers may knowingly seek unrestricted products. Others may struggle to identify which operators are licensed for their country. These are different problems, requiring different responses.

Questions for policy evaluation

• Can consumers readily identify a locally licensed operator?
• Do protective interventions reduce harmful losses, and among which groups?
• Do affected players stop, reduce their activity or move elsewhere?
• Do enforcement measures interrupt access or merely shift it to replacement domains?

These questions connect market monitoring with consumer outcomes. They cannot be answered by assuming that a lower tax rate or more advertising would necessarily produce a safer market.

The role of digital intermediaries

Search engines, advertising services, payment providers and hosting companies can influence whether consumers find and use an unlicensed operator. The German hosting-provider example illustrates one route for intervention, but legal responsibilities depend on the service and jurisdiction involved.

European coordination also needs precise terminology. TRIS supports the notification and examination of draft technical rules under Directive (EU) 2015/1535. It is not a harmonised European gambling-licensing framework.

Cooperation is useful when it produces measurable outcomes, such as fewer repeat appearances of an illegal offer. A large number of takedown requests is an activity measure, rather than proof of lower gambling harm.

Conclusion

Channelisation and enforcement data can reveal weaknesses in a regulated market, but only if their definitions and limitations remain visible. British stakes estimates, Dutch GGR estimates and counts of blocked domains answer different questions.

Effective evaluation combines those measures with evidence about player behaviour and protection. The objective is to understand which interventions work, for whom, and whether the benefits persist when unlicensed operators adapt.